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FDR, the Rhetoric of Vision, and the Creation of a National Synoptic State 
Abstract 
 
Throughout his administration, FDR engaged in a complex set of arguments that worked together 
to defend democracy in general as a viable form of government; American democracy as the 
highest expression of democratic government; the primacy of the federal government as the most 
efficient and effective locus of democratic power; and the executive office as the culmination of 
the form, efficiency, and locus of that power. My specific concern here is with one form those 
arguments took, the visual metaphors that permeate FDR’s rhetoric. Visuality in FDR’s rhetoric 
is especially intriguing because of the way it interacted with the prevailing political culture in 
order to underwrite radical shifts in political power by helping FDR persuade the mass public to 
accept a synoptic view of nationalism and governmental responsibility. These changes have 
implications for presidents, presidential candidates, and for the citizens whose support they seek. 
 
  
2 
 
 
FDR, the Rhetoric of Vision, and the Creation of a National Synoptic State 
 
We take the size and power of the federal government for granted. Even those who object 
most to “federal intervention” in national affairs have trouble locating precise areas in which 
they do not want governmental involvement, and have, since Ronald Reagan first issued his call 
to “get government off the backs of the American people,” consistently supported legislation 
increasing federal power in various aspects of our national life.1 We take the president’s role in 
the federal government for granted as well. It is “the president’s budget,” and “the president’s 
agenda,” and while there are debates about the efficacy of presidential efforts to lead public 
opinion no one seriously questions the ubiquity of such efforts.2 While political scientists and 
historians situate these changes in the 1930s and 1940s and credit Franklin D. Roosevelt with the 
impetus behind them,3 very little research has been done on the persuasive work that fostered 
Roosevelt’s articulation of primacy for U.S. federal government in general and for the person of 
the president very much in particular.4 Those articulations, significant in Roosevelt’s day, remain 
important exigencies for presidents and presidential candidates. 
At the time of FDR’s ascension to office and throughout his administration, there were 
loud and contentious debates about the appropriate forms a modern democratic government 
could and should take.5 These debates concerned the best way to ensure efficiency in the midst 
of crisis on the one hand and preserve democracy in the midst of a world that seemed 
increasingly prone to militarism, communism, and fascism on the other.6 In this political context, 
FDR engaged in a complex set of arguments that worked together to defend democracy in 
general as a viable form of government; American democracy as the highest expression of 
democratic government characterized by a specific kind of citizenship; the primacy of the federal 
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government as the most efficient and effective locus of democratic power; and the executive 
office as the culmination of the form, efficiency, and locus of that power. These arguments 
underwrote changes that continue to affect the practices of the chief executive and the rhetoric of 
those who aspire to that office.7 
These arguments were defended in a wide variety of ways throughout the Roosevelt 
administration. Presidential rhetorical competence has always been an important aspect of 
success in the office,8 but the nature of that expertise changes over time and across media.9 FDR 
was famous in his own day as well as in ours as a master of the press10 and is widely understood 
as the first president to take serious advantage of radio,11 both of which are often cited as the 
reason for his extraordinary relationship with the mass public.12 There is also evidence that he 
made astute use of newsreels.13 As the nation moved from a reliance on print media to more 
visual communication on the one hand and an entirely aural form of communication on the other, 
FDR operated at the intersection of these communicative forms.14 Roosevelt’s communicative 
talent is widely acknowledged.15 He is regarded as a progenitor of press management16 and as a 
rhetor of uncommon skill.17 His persuasive discourse is often understood as one of the 
foundations of his presidency18 if not as the major reason for its success.19 Roosevelt’s 
communicative skill is unquestioned and unquestionably integral to his political success. 
My specific concern here is with one way in which that skill was displayed, the visual 
metaphors that permeate FDR’s rhetoric, and which, to use Michael Osborn’s terms, set his 
argument before his listeners’ eyes, and invited them to see as he saw, to accept his role as their 
representative.20 Davis W. Houck has convincingly demonstrated the importance of Roosevelt’s 
visual rhetoric as a mechanism that assisted his efforts to camouflage his disability and attain the 
presidency.21 Houck’s analysis of FDR’s use of bodily and sensate metaphors reveals an 
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important function of that rhetoric. Presidential embodiment is, as Houck shows, a rich site of 
rhetorical analysis, and his work reveals important insights into the associations between the 
president’s body, perceptions of the nation’s political health, and the gendered nature of the 
institution of the presidency. 
But as Cara Finnegan notes, Roosevelt’s visual rhetoric operated on many levels,22 
including educating the public, providing reassurance, and encouraging mobilization.23 
Certainly, as Finnegan also observes, this language “echoes a larger cultural shift in Depression-
era modes of knowledge and representation,”24 reflecting the era’s conflation of “seeing” and 
“knowing.” Her work concentrates on the cultural shifts revealed and enabled by this conflation, 
which pointed to “visual remedies” for the nation’s ills.25 For Finnegan, a documentary form of 
seeing led credence to specific forms of representation and supported certain kinds of policies. 
Building on those insights, I am interested here in the institutional remedies whose warrants were 
frequently framed in visual language, namely, the shift in political power from the state and local 
governments to the national government, and within the federal system from congressional to 
presidential centrality.  
The persuasive work associated with these shifts was extensive and encompassed non-
visual as well as visual language. But ocular metaphors were particularly useful for they 
resonated with the era’s cultural emphasis on authenticity and helped render much that was 
unfamiliar more proximate.26 Visuality in FDR’s rhetoric is especially intriguing because of the 
way it interacted with the prevailing political culture in order to underwrite radical shifts in 
political power by helping FDR persuade the mass public to accept a synoptic view of 
nationalism and governmental responsibility.27 These changes organized government and 
citizenship in particular ways. In order to facilitate national planning and a national program, 
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Roosevelt had to develop a national vision. In James C. Scott’s terms, he had to see like a state.28 
But he also had to encourage the nation to participate in this new way of understanding 
politics.29 In so doing, he fundamentally changed the nature of the federal government and its 
relationship to the national citizenry. 
My argument proceeds in three parts. First, I briefly discuss the national crisis that 
provided both the context and much of the impetus for Roosevelt’s political actions. I then turn 
to the political shifts that occurred during the Roosevelt years and to the visual language that 
helped accomplish the persuasive work authorizing those shifts. I conclude with a discussion of 
the consequences of the Rooseveltian revolution and the synoptic state it engendered. 
Democracy in Crisis 
As the world depression deepened in the early 1930s, it was no wonder that governments 
teetered and collapsed.30 By 1933, national unemployment in the United States ranged 
somewhere between 25 and 37 percent, depending on how the data were calculated.31 In some 
places, it hovered at around 80 percent.32 Business investment was 90 percent lower than it had 
been a mere four years previously.33 In the same period, the American Gross National Product 
fell by 30 percent while farm prices fell by twice that number and industrial production was 
halved.34 On a more human level, the suicide rate rose dramatically35 while homes were being 
lost at the rate of a thousand a day, throwing families into the streets and overwhelming what 
little sources of relief states and localities were able to provide.36 According to Secretary of the 
Interior Harold Ickes, upon whom much of the administration of relief would fall, “Millions of 
people were half fed . . .barely clothed . . .and living more like kennelless dogs than human 
beings.”37 The poverty and dislocations caused by the economic cataclysm—physical, social, 
economic, and psychological—cannot be imagined by those of us who did not experience them 
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directly. Those who were there searched for comparisons through which they could make the 
disaster intelligible. When asked if he’d knew of anything comparable to the Depression, for 
instance, economist John Maynard Keynes replied affirmatively, adding, “it was called the Dark 
Ages, and it lasted four hundred years.”38 Prevailing theories of government and economics were 
all but entirely discredited and the way forward was unclear at best.39 
In this context, it was doubtful that the traditional forms of government could or should 
be saved.40As “radio priest” Father Charles E. Coughlin put it in 1934, “Truly, democracy itself 
is on trial.”41 Challenges to traditional structures pervaded popular culture, up to and including 
arguments for dictatorship.42 Such calls were associated not only with Roosevelt as a personality 
but also with an increasing fear that without dictatorial powers in the hands of a strong executive, 
order would be impossible. These fears were exacerbated by continuing threats to that order. In 
1934 alone, for instance, 1.4 million workers went on strike,43 and there were widespread 
indications that people were rapidly losing their respect for and fear of the law.44 Interestingly, 
the response to the economic disaster was not always expressed as violence or panic, but often as 
depression, alienation, resignation, despair, and as individual failure and self-blame.45 The entire 
nation felt these consequences directly or indirectly as all the old verities and the hierarchies 
associated with them crumbled.  
Events abroad were equally disconcerting. Hitler’s rise paralleled Roosevelt’s own, and 
Japan’s increased militarism created very real concern about the repercussions for American 
interests in Asia.46 The United States, isolated and prosperous throughout the 1920s, retained its 
isolationism if not its prosperity throughout the 1930s, but as the decade progressed citizens 
became increasingly agitated by the fear that events abroad would impel the nation into another 
cataclysmic war.47 
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Roosevelt’s election in 1932 may have provided hope, at least on the domestic front, but 
it solved nothing. FDR campaigned on a promise to initiate “bold, persistent experimentation,”48 
in addressing the national economic crisis. But the Depression, punctuated by mild bouts of 
recovery, continued into the early 1940s. International tensions ebbed and flowed throughout the 
period, culminating in the attack on Pearl Harbor and the bloodbath of world war.49 While 
Roosevelt responded to these events by attempting to modernize and reorganize what passed for 
the American state, he met considerable resistance. His goal was to centralize political 
administration, to make it more efficient, more amenable to wide scale planning; in a word, to 
render American politics more synoptic. Throughout his entire time in office FDR argued that 
democracy was viable, especially in the United States, which nurtured a certain kind of citizen, 
and that the best hope of preserving democracy was a strong national government headed by a 
strong president. These arguments were often made in language that evoked the visual. 
Roosevelt’s Synoptic State 
To address the unprecedented national crisis, Americans were willing to endorse 
sweeping changes, especially in the initial days of FDR’s first term, including grants of 
extraordinary power to the national government and to its chief executive. Importantly, the scope 
of these changes, if not their consequences, was clearly understood at the time.50 FDR’s plans 
thus had to be defended publicly and often, for serious danger lay in the issue of how the 
acquisition of power would be read in a global context that included the American fear of the 
Soviet Union and the rise to power of dictators in Germany and Italy.51 In the face of challenges 
to the viability of democracy posed by the economic crisis and these dictators, Roosevelt argued 
that he was committed to both preserving and modernizing the forms of democratic governance 
in the United States.52 Visual language was integral to this effort. 
8 
 
In many ways, national government requires that the nation be rendered visible.53 
Importantly, the imperatives behind this requirement are market-driven; increased national 
rationalism is connected to increased national productivity and access to markets.54 Rationalism 
is attained through making the nation visible and thus amenable to hierarchical ordering. In this 
process, its multitude of disparate elements must be abstracted, ordered, rendered legible. This 
legibility implies a central position from which the nation can be seen, understood, and managed, 
so national government and administration are required. This was a difficult challenge for 
Americans to meet in the 1930s, for as many scholars have noted, there is a problematic 
relationship between visuality and democracy.55 Citizens want to be able to see their leaders and 
they want those leaders’ actions to be transparent in ways that directly contrast to a monarchy’s 
reliance on ritual.56 Democratic display needs to be more symbolically oriented toward 
accountability than toward spectacle,57 a need that reflects belief in a specific kind of audience, 
one that is attentive, witnessing, and capable of rational deliberation, even while organization on 
a mass scale works to reduce the importance of any singular individual.58 The state must be seen 
even as it makes the nation visible and the processes of accomplishing this must be understood as 
transparent if they are also to be understood as democratic.59 In making this transition to a 
synoptic state, Roosevelt’s first step was to argue that democracy was not only a viable but also 
an intrinsically superior form of government. 
“I Paint it For You in Hope”60: The Viability of Democracy 
Despite the widespread belief that the Depression provided inescapable evidence that 
democracy could not survive,61 Roosevelt argued that it remained viable and was, indeed, the 
system of government most likely to return the world to economic stability, revealing the close 
relationship presidents have always fostered between economic capitalism and political 
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democracy. For Roosevelt, democracy was not only the truest expression of the best of human 
nature but also the system most likely to ensure that its citizens were productive and prosperous 
as well as happy.62 In 1934, for example, he vividly depicted the days before his election:  
Individuals were seeking quick riches at the expense of other individuals. Geographical 
sections were seeking economic preference for themselves to the disadvantage of other 
sections. Cities were recklessly offering inducements to manufacturing plants to move 
away from other cities. Within given industries unfair competition went on unheeded or 
resulted in vast consolidations whose securities were peddled to the public at dishonest 
prices. There was little consideration for the social point of view, and no planning 
whatsoever to avoid the pitfalls of overproduction or of selling methods which foisted 
articles on a gullible public, which the family budget could not afford.63 
Blame for the economic crisis was specifically located in a poor use of vision. Roosevelt 
argued here that he understood the causes of the national calamity (unwise searching) and where 
to affix the blame for it. This is consistent with his tendency, as Thomas Farrell notes, to put 
malevolence in the past, as already remedied. Consequently, while blame was clearly fixed, 
punishment was also not required.64 In this depiction, the “gullible” mass of citizens were 
described as victims of ignorant and unscrupulous business practices and of a government that 
had not cared enough to intervene. Under his administration, Roosevelt argued, ignorance was 
being corrected, business practices were being reformed, and government was instituting a better 
way of seeing, a “social point of view.” This perspective required planning to achieve the results 
it promised. Democratic capitalism as a system was, in this depiction, sound; its ill were 
correctable and were being corrected. All that was required for this correction was an 
endorsement of Roosevelt’s government which embodied “the social point of view.” 
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Democracy, according to FDR was the form of government most able to instantiate this 
perspective. Roosevelt thus urged reform rather than revolution. In his first inaugural, more 
noted for his willingness to assume extraordinary power than for his reliance on American 
traditions of limited government, he said, “Action in this image and to this end is feasible under 
the form of government which we have inherited from our ancestors. Our Constitution is so 
simple and so practical that it is possible always to meet extraordinary needs by changes in 
emphasis and arrangement without loss of essential form.”65 Roosevelt thus argued that nothing 
drastic needed to happen to existing structures in order to produce drastic results. This is the 
rhetoric of purification,66 not revolution: “It is our task to perfect, to improve, to alter when 
necessary, but in all cases to go forward.”67 FDR prized movement and activity; for him 
stagnation was political death.68 But, he argued, he did not intend to make changes to the 
fundamentals. He was only interested in changing them enough to bring them in line with the 
modern world.69  
FDR seems to have assumed that any necessary economic reforms would be produced 
indirectly through a modernized political system that focused on the provision of social justice, 
represented as light rather than opposing darkness: “These dark days will be worth all they cost 
us,” he said in his first inaugural, “if they teach us that our true destiny is not to be ministered 
unto but to minister to ourselves and to our fellow men.”70 The task of government under FDR 
was to facilitate the New Deal ministry.71 
That ministry was based on a Christianized view of government responsibilities, which 
included a major emphasis on the idea of social justice through improved government. For 
Roosevelt, democracy, religion,72 and civilization were all intimately connected. He could not 
envision any one of these without the others. Under his administration, citizens saw the nation in 
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the same terms. One correspondent told the president that, “I believe the old age pensions, aid for 
crippled children and unemployment insurance are essential to a human and civilized society, to 
say nothing of a supposedly Christian nation.”73 Others complained that New Deal programs 
(especially repeal of Prohibition) were “running rough shod over the teaching of Christianity.”74 
In both these cases, and in others like them, the expectation was that the nation would be 
governed in ways that were congruent with “Christian” theology. 
Roosevelt encouraged the nation to understand world history as an upward trajectory in 
which human rights and individual freedom were increasingly realized. “With every passing 
year,” he said, “I become more confident that humanity is moving forward to the practical 
application of the teachings of Christianity as they affect the individual lives of men and women 
everywhere.”75 Relying here as in so much of his public speech, on values and images associated 
with mainstream Christianity, he explicitly applied Christian teleology to political life.76 An 
example from 1938 encapsulates much of this tendency: “Clearer every day is the one great 
lesson of history—the lesson taught by the Master of Galilee—that the only road to peace and 
the only road to a happier and better civilization is the road to unity—the road called the 
‘Highway of Fellowship.’ But as the community of interest becomes apparent to those who live 
on farm and in city, the strategy of the cold-blooded few to divide and conquer, to make common 
men blind to their common interests, becomes more active.”77 This glorious compendium of 
mixed metaphors rests on a visual foundation. Not only did the vision increasingly available to 
the mass of Americans through FDR pose a threat to those he characterized as “the cold-blooded 
few,” but that in turn opened up a new clarity of vision for them, who were able to perceive the 
exact nature of the threat and move to counter it. The more clearly “the cold-blooded few” saw, 
the more determined they became to darken the vision of the rest of the nation. Those who could 
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not see clearly were so deluded that they would attempt to delude others. Roosevelt, like the 
“Master of Galilee,” could see the correct road, the road that led to a “happier and better 
civilization.” Because of this clarity of vision, he was able to unmask the machinations of his 
Republican opposition. FDR thus identified vision as the site of struggle; the contest was not 
over citizens’ “hearts and minds” in today’s tired parlance, but over their eyes, for the proper 
mode of seeing was the condition for victory in the political struggle.  
Calling on the rhetorical traditions of western civilization, clear sightedness was equated 
with clear thinking in the Rooseveltian vocabulary. Thus, both foreign and domestic threats were 
portrayed as “shadows”78 or in metaphors that conjured darkness or in one way or another 
obscured vision. He spoke of “clouds of suspicion,”79 and of “menacing clouds,”80 of a potential 
“black out of peace,”81 of “nations without light,”82 and of his determination that “we will never 
permit, if we can help it, the light to grow dim.”83 Preserving the light required consciously 
avoiding deception. In 1940, for instance, in a message asking for increased defense 
appropriations, he said, “Let us examine, without self-deception, the dangers which confront us. 
Let us measure our strength and our defense without self-delusion.”84 For Roosevelt, illusions, 
deceptions, and lies were all elements that created darkness; collectively, American citizens 
would arrive at an accurate picture in the light of reality. “It is not in despair that I paint you this 
picture,” he said in his second inaugural. “I paint it for you in hope—because the Nation, seeing 
and understanding the injustice in it, proposes to paint it out.”85 Roosevelt equated vision, 
understanding, compassion, and national unity, all of which were critical elements in his 
invitation to participate in a national synoptic state. There is abundant evidence that citizens 
accepted this invitation: In late 1935, for instance, Roosevelt sent letters to the national clergy 
asking for reports on local conditions and opinions. Some 7,000 clergymen replied. Both his 
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critics and his supporters included information about the smallest of local details and related 
those details directly to the need for the president to understand local conditions in order to make 
wise and compassionate national policy.86 
It is clear, then, that Roosevelt argued with some effect in response to both internal and 
external challenges that democracy was not only viable but was the system most in keeping with 
human development. Democracy stood opposed to oppressive regimes such as Communism and 
Fascism, and, once its structures were modernized, it would return to its former goals and 
provide economic prosperity and social justice. He justified this faith in democracy as a system 
through the example of its enactment in the United States, which for Roosevelt, served as the 
exemplar of world democracy. In this vision, citizens held a central place. 
“Widen the Orbit of Vision” 87: Citizenship in the Synoptic State 
Because of this faith in the teleology of democracy, Roosevelt argued that the American 
people collectively had vision, and as president, he served that vision: “As the humble 
instruments of their vision and their power, those of us who were chosen to serve them in 1932 
turned to the great task,”88 he told a Wisconsin audience in 1934. Because of the clarity and 
perspective his office provided, he could see what the mass of Americans saw—but he could see 
it more clearly than they. Their vision was individual; his task was to perceive, collate, and enact 
that vision into a singular national vision. He was the agent of the people, the instrument of their 
will, but as that agent, he had a unique perspective because he could see the whole while others 
were limited in their vision to a part of that whole. He thus mobilized visual language as a way of 
defining synoptic citizenship. 
The people’s vision was informed by the national government and also informed that 
government’s larger vision. Ocular citizenship was also therefore inherently democratic. FDR 
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argued in 1940 that “the crash of swiftly moving events over the earth has made us all think with 
a longer view.”89 He encouraged his audience to “look ahead and see” the consequences of the 
burgeoning war, and said, “Summing up this need of looking ahead, and in words of common 
sense and good American citizenship, I hope that we shall have fewer American ostriches in our 
midst. It is not good for the ultimate health of ostriches to bury their heads in the sand.”90 He 
opposed those at home and abroad who were willfully narrow in their outlook—the capitalists 
who opposed the New Deal, the isolationists who opposed American intervention in the 
European war, and the Fascists who opposed democracy were united in their inability to see 
beyond the selfish needs of the moment. Democratic citizens in a synoptic state, on the other 
hand, were characterized by their ability to see clearly, to take the “longer view.” 
By virtue of their position, presidents had a specific sort of responsibility vis-à-vis 
individual citizens: “For a President especially it is a duty to think in national terms. He must 
think not only of this year but of future years when someone else will be President. He must look 
beyond the average of the prosperity and well-being of the country, for averages can cover up 
danger spots or poverty and instability.”91 The president’s job was to look beyond, to see farther 
and more deeply than anyone else, to survey the entire nation and to act on the shared national 
vision. Poorly perceived nationalism was dangerous, for averages were potentially deceptive. 
Only a clear-sighted nationalism, firmly grounded in democratic norms, would be able to 
perceive and act upon true national needs. It was a bottom up vision that found expression from 
the top down, as supporters found themselves seeing “eye to eye” with the president.92  
Not everyone agreed with the president’s vision. One of the president’s critics noted, for 
example, that those “who try to think clearly and are far-seeing” are and “always will be in the 
minority.”93 Another critic accused him of “shadow boxing with realities.”94 Regardless of 
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partisan affiliation, the political argument was often couched in visual terms. A number of 
citizens writing to Roosevelt, for example, often commented on the clarity of his vision.95 They 
also wanted him to see as they saw. They sent him postcards, church bulletins, pictures of all 
kinds so that he could see and thus understand local conditions and consequently make better 
national policy.96 His critics also responded with sometimes scathing comments on local 
conditions.97 In all these cases, citizens were working to create a shared national vision by trying 
to influence the president’s perception of the nation.98 Citizenship required sharing vernacular 
visions with national actors, for only a national government could see and thus govern the entire 
nation. 
“The Whole Picture”99: Federal Primacy 
Roosevelt took office with a mandate for “undelayed action,”100 and for him that meant 
federal action. While FDR receives most of the credit for the barrage of legislation that was the 
Hundred Days, it is also true that during those days he encouraged congressional initiatives, a 
fact that may well explain his very productive and generally cooperative relationship with his 
first Congress.101 Members of the public soon learned to look to the federal government for help, 
and this fact alone wrought enormous changes in the relationship between the people and their 
government.102 It was not uncommon for citizens to tell FDR that, “Only the Federal 
Government can put a stop to such abuses.”103 Halford R. Ryan argued that “First, the political 
and philosophical theses of FDR’s New Deal rhetoric were that the presidency and Congress had 
the legal power and the political obligation to address a national Depression at the national level 
with national legislation.”104 This is critical to understanding Roosevelt’s defense of federal 
primacy because a central tenet of that defense was the claim that, “We have undertaken a new 
order of things: yet we progress to it under the framework and in the spirit and intent of the 
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American Constitution.”105 Roosevelt was continually defending the legalities of his moves 
under the Constitution, defenses that would not have been needed if the moves had been less 
controversial.  
One way he managed these controversies was by manipulating images in a form of 
antithesis. Roosevelt often placed images in proximity to one another, inviting audiences to “see” 
the differences between them. He was especially fond of images relating to size, enabling him to 
reduce complicated ideas and sprawling policies to manageable dimensions. He was also able to 
reduce the significance of his opponents by rendering them into “small minorities” with “petty 
concerns” who needed to be stopped from wielding large and thus disproportionate power.106 
These people were consistently placed in opposition not just to FDR, but also to the “vast 
majority” of Americans who agreed with him on whatever policy was under discussion.107 By 
manipulating size, FDR also evoked the audience’s visual acuity: big things became small and 
small things became big. It was common for him to assert that, “There are, of course, men, a few 
men, who might thwart this great common purpose by seeking selfish advantage.”108 His 
majorities were rarely just majorities—they tended to be “overwhelming,”109 just as the groups 
who opposed him were generally “small.”110 This manipulation of size—big majorities who 
were relatively powerless facing small minorities who had disproportionately large power—had 
both political effects, in that it encouraged national unity, and potentially disorienting effects, in 
that it called for a change in one’s understanding of reality through a sensual experience of 
altered size and proportion.111  
This is better understood as antithesis than as amplification and reduction because the 
rhetorical power doesn’t come primarily from the manipulation of size alone but from the 
immediate juxtaposition of different sizes of things. That is, Roosevelt did not just sometimes 
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refer to his opponents as small and at other times as his supporters as large; these two 
characterizations almost always appeared together. In addition, small groups were often depicted 
as having large amounts of power, and also as making small problems or issues appear larger 
than they in fact were.112 In his fourth Fireside Chat, for instance, he said,  
Because in every step which your Government is taking we are thinking in terms of the 
average of you—in the old words “the greatest good for the greatest number”—we, as 
reasonable people, cannot expect to bring definite benefits to every person or to every 
occupation or business, or industry or agriculture. In the same way no reasonable person 
can expect that in this short space of time, during which new machinery had to be not 
only put to work, but first set up, that every locality in every one of the forty-eight States 
of the country, could share equally and simultaneously in the trend to better times. The 
whole picture, however—the average of the whole territory from coast to coast—the 
average of the whole population of 120,000,000 people—shows to any person willing to 
look, facts and action of which you and I can be proud.113 
Notice how he manipulated size via companion terms throughout this passage. The 
federal government was positioned as able to see and thus to understand the entire nation, from 
its largest incarnations to its smallest details. He began with “every step,” and a concern for “the 
average,” followed by “the greatest number,” who needed “definite benefits” for “every person 
or to every occupation or business,” a single “reasonable person,” “every locality in every one of 
the forty-eight states,” “The whole picture,” “the average of the whole territory” and “the 
average of the whole population,” and concluded with “any person.” The swelling and reduction 
of the nouns in this one brief passage is downright vertiginous. This dislocation allows for 
relocation—distance was reduced and propinquity established. The distances between his 
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auditors and between his auditors and himself were bridged and the audience invited to see as 
FDR saw, to participate through him in an embodied politics in which he represented the shared 
perspective of the audience.114  
Importantly, this passage both depicts the entire nation and rests on a visual metaphor. 
The national government was positioned as having unique access to the “whole picture,” and as 
able to elucidate it to “any person willing to look.” The task of the national government was to 
apprehend the national “picture,” and the task of the citizen was to be “willing to look” at that 
picture as it was explained to them by the president—who assumed interpretive authority over 
the nation. 
 “He Must Look Beyond”115: Presidential Centrality 
Unlike the shift from a local to a national policy orientation, the establishment of 
presidential political dominance implied personal as well as institutional power. This connection 
caused Roosevelt enormous difficulties, for it was here that the allegations of dictatorship 
resonated most deeply.116 There was simply no denying that his leadership was indeed strongly 
centered in the person and personality of the president. In part, this was probably an artifact of 
his medium of communication.117 But in part, it was also an artifact of Roosevelt’s rhetoric and 
the ways it resonated with the public. For example, one minister replied to the president’s request 
for information about local conditions and needs by asking for farm equipment. “A single 
tractor,” he noted, “properly placed, could do much to take care of many garden plots and the 
expense would be trifling.”118 This clergyman felt able to ask the president to satisfy a purely 
local need. In another example, a bishop told the president that, “You have tried to build a bridge 
between the dim visions of unhappy, restless men and women, and the victorious realization of 
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those visions.” 119 For these correspondents, vision and the reduction of distance were related, if 
in ways that seem grammatically obscure.  
This linkage was crucial, because both the reduction of distance and the personal trust 
engendered by this rhetorical intimacy were powerful elements authorizing the shift in 
institutional power. William  H. Watts, for example, wrote to the president, “I have thought all 
along that you, Mr. President, and the men of undoubted integrity to whom you have entrusted 
the carrying out of your plans know best what ought to be done and the best way to do it.” 120 
Citizens like Watts “recognized” FDR’s superior vantage point and authorized action in keeping 
with that superiority.  
Roosevelt consistently claimed that while democracy was viable and that in the United 
States it found its clearest and most vibrant expression, the previous decade had corrupted the 
system, thus requiring restorative action. That action could only be effective if it was carried out 
by a national synoptic state. “In the White House today,” he said in 1940, “we have built up a 
great mosaic of the state of the union from thousands of bits of information—from one man or 
woman this thought; from another, data on some event; a scrap here perhaps and a scrap there; 
from every Congressional district in the Union and from rich and poor; from enthusiast and 
complainant; from liberal and conservative; from Republican and Democrat.”121 Here Roosevelt 
portrayed himself as an artist crafting a mosaic from tiny bits of unrelated materials. Only he 
could see the whole before the mosaic was completed; his internal vision determined the final 
shape. He was both the instrument of the people and the guiding hand of national unity. As an 
agent his was the task of ordering and disciplining the visual in the service of national goals. But 
as the agent, he had a perspective on those goals no one else could match.  
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The president was not only graced with a certain perspective but also obligated to act 
upon it. He said, “Nevertheless, as the Executive head of Government, I am compelled to look 
facts in the face.”122 The ethotic element of this visual language allowed him to argue for his 
definitions as the correct definitions; they were not a matter of contention, but were “recognized” 
truths. His perspective ultimately trumped that of anyone else.123 In arguing for the dominance of 
his perspective he was also implicitly arguing for the dominance of the executive over the 
legislative branch at the national level and for the national government over those of localities as 
well. If perspective was the determining force of solid public policy, power should follow it. But 
perspective wasn’t the only visual element supporting Roosevelt’s claim to authority. He could 
not only see farther than others, he could also see more clearly.  
If a national perspective gave the president the obligation to assume power over the more 
limited perspectives of local governments and the national legislature, his clarity of vision gave 
him the obligation to outline the details of policy aimed at the national situation. Roosevelt 
consistently declared that things were “evident,” or “clear.” He constantly dispelled “illusions” 
and often claimed that we could not afford to be “blinded” by erroneous claims, dreams, or other 
misapprehensions124 and facilitated a shared national vision.125 
That shared national vision was remarkably intimate. Through his use of depiction, FDR 
combined form and content to legitimate his claim to see for and thus to act for his national 
constituency.126 The intimacy he thus established is one of the hallmarks of his 
communication127 and correspondents sometimes addressed him as “Frank,” or referred to him in 
familial or other kinds of familiar ways.128 One of the best examples of such depiction is his 
1944 Christmas Eve Address to the nation:  
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The Christmas spirit lives tonight in the bitter cold of the front lines in Europe and in the 
heat of the jungles and swamps of Burma and the Pacific islands. Even the roar of our 
bombers and fighters in the air and the guns of our ships at sea will not drown out the 
messages of Christmas which come to the hearts of our fighting men. The thoughts of 
these men tonight will turn to us here at home around our Christmas trees, surrounded by 
our children and grandchildren and their Christmas stockings and gifts—just as our own 
thoughts go out to them, tonight and every night, in their distant places.129  
Here Roosevelt evoked both theaters of the war and the home front with equal power and with 
equal import. He invited the troops abroad to see Christmas at home even as those at home were 
asked to see the experience of the troops.130 Audiences were prompted not only to feel the 
meaning of Christmas but also to picture this idealized view of how the holiday appeared across 
the nation and across the world. By enabling emotional connections among his auditors through 
depiction, FDR established himself as the crucial link between those auditors and between them 
and the government, for he could see—and thus facilitate his audiences’ vision—the entire 
picture. The nation had become synoptically unified.131 
Roosevelt’s Vision 
It cannot be a coincidence that FDR, who communicated so frequently over radio, used 
such a preponderance of visual cues. In an era when visuality was integral to the national 
experience, visual language, as Cara Finnegan notes, would have resonated both widely and 
deeply.132 This resonance surely assisted Roosevelt’s efforts to mask his disability.133 But it had 
other consequences as well. Roosevelt didn’t simply encourage his listeners to see. He 
encouraged them to see as he saw, with the same clarity he brought to national and international 
issues, and with the same long-range vision that enabled action aimed at the future as well as the 
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present. Such rhetoric, spoken so consistently for such a long time, helped establish his deep and 
intimate relationship with the American public for it brought them into his realm of experience 
even as he seemed to participate in theirs. William Gorham Rice, for instance, wrote the 
president on that, “What you said in your speech last night is exactly what our citizens needed to 
hear from one who is constantly surveying the situation,” indicating that FDR had made his 
experience clear to at least one member of his audience.134 Another correspondent noted that his 
speeches made him feel “very near.”135 There is no doubt that citizens felt closely connected to 
this president in a way that has few, if any, parallels. 
During FDR’s administration the public attitude toward the federal government changed 
and the vehicle for that change was the person of the president himself. Famously, the biggest 
ovation he received during his first inaugural was after his assertion that he would not hesitate to 
assume wartime power, a particularly chilling thought given the fervent isolationism of the 
period and the rise of dictators abroad.136 Members of the mass public felt connected to him and 
to his wife. They wrote to him in numbers that seem incredible.137 The White House received 
between 5,000 and 8,000 letters a day.138 They equated him with both Jesus and Moses.139 They 
hung his portrait in their homes.140 The lines that accompanied his funeral train from Georgia to 
Washington remain legendary.141And they hated him with an intensity and venom that in itself 
was indicative of how personal and personalized his governance had become.142 
Roosevelt worked hard to create and maintain the personal aspect of his power. He 
wooed the press, set very specific rules for his press conferences and he increased the number of 
staffers dedicated to news management by over 300 percent.143 He began his Fireside Chats with 
the homey greeting, “My friends,” and he did not hesitate to reach out to every audience in ways 
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that tied the public’s allegiance to him as much as to the government he led. And, importantly for 
my argument, his rhetoric created a participatory experience for listeners.144  
That experience was instrumental to his overall task of encouraging the country to think, 
believe, and act as a nation; moving the center of political life from localities and states to the 
federal level; shifting the weight of power and influence over policy thus nationalized from the 
Congress to the Executive; and basing all of this on mediated communication that allowed the 
president to establish and maintain a “personal” relationship with the mass public. All of these 
were facilitated by Roosevelt’s ability to enable his audience to visualize the nation as a whole 
and to participate in that vision.  
That participation allowed FDR to organize the task of building an American state based 
upon the collection, abstraction and management of various localities. Under Roosevelt, politics, 
economics, and popular culture became more “mass” than vernacular. Nation building was 
accompanied by serious economic, political, and social dislocations. Many of these were both 
facilitated and masked by rhetoric relying on visuality and relying on claims to a shared national 
perspective. That rhetoric constituted a unified public with a clear vision of the national future. It 
excluded from that public those who did not share the president’s vision. 
He structured politics around group interests and opened the floodgates of lobbying.145 
He opened Washington’s doors to group pressure and managed those pressures himself through 
an artful and devious personalized system of policymaking. Centralized government exploded 
under his administration, leaving a legacy of governmental edifices strewn throughout the capital 
city and along its famous Mall and a bewildering structure of competing, overlapping, and 
contending departments and agencies. 
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He brought mass media and the presidency together in ways that the nation had never 
seen before,146 and his style of personalized and personal politics, which worked so well for him, 
have had important consequences for the political system. As biographer James MacGregor 
Burns noted, “He took the role of national father, of bipartisan leader, of President of all the 
people. Playing this role with consummate skill, he extracted from it the last morsel of political 
power and government action.”147 His successors, less endowed with Roosevelt’s skill, have 
nonetheless continued to play the roles Roosevelt created, and have increasingly aggrandized the 
office and raised our expectations concerning those who occupy it. This legacy permeates the 
language of modern presidential campaigns and these developments remain enormously 
consequential in the practice of contemporary politics. 
FDR’s rhetoric authorized one hegemonic view of national life, displaced local 
experiences of the nation, helped to legitimate a strong federal government and the rather 
paternalistic role of the chief executive within that government. It did these things while 
rendering its own hierarchies and exclusions invisible. It is important to note too, that this 
experience was not actually participatory. Even as citizens were feeling more strongly connected 
to the president, he was, in fact, further removed from them. Fewer people actually had direct 
access to the chief executive and as policy making became more bureaucratized and more 
national, there was less individual influence on policy that more directly impacted increasing 
numbers of people.148 Roosevelt argued consistently that sharing his vision, seeing through his 
eyes, enabled the protection of the vernacular on the national level and that the synoptic state 
was consistent with republican norms and democratic practices. But it is not so easy to reconcile 
democratic citizenship with a strong centralized state and a strong executive, for whenever the 
local is subsumed into the national, individuation is inevitably lost. The more politics moved to 
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the national level, the more citizens were distanced from those politics and the harder presidents 
and presidential candidates must work to establish a “personal” connection to the mass public. 
These tensions, created during the Roosevelt era, continue to characterize our national politics, 
creating also a central set of issues for those who wish to understand the presidency, national 
citizenship, and the ways in which they influence one another. 
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